The political upheaval triggered by the downfall of Bo and the
"Chongqing model" – is still unfolding in China. Although the model is
not fundamentally different from the national agenda of neoliberal
global integration, it included more independent social policies. These
proved so popular, it took what the Financial Times has called a "palace
coup" to crush it.
Corruption charges have been brought against Bo, and his wife Gu Kailai
is detained, suspected of murder.... Under attack are not only these
individuals, but also forces supporting the search for an alternative
to the dominant growth pattern and the Chongqing model itself, with all
of its hallmarks: changhong, or "singing red songs"; dahei, smashing criminal gangs and corruption; and minsheng, promotion of distributive social policies.
Also worth watching is the video interview from Real News Network:
Minqi Li is an
Assistant Professor at the University of Utah specializing in Political
Economy, World Systems and the Chinese Economy. He was a political
prisoner in China from 1990 to 1992. He is the author of "After
Neoliberalism: Empire, Social Democracy, or Socialism?
PAUL JAY, SENIOR EDITOR, TRNN: Welcome to The Real News Network. I'm Paul Jay in Washington.
And
in Washington on Tuesday, President Obama met with Vice President Xi of
China, who's expected to be the next leader, leader of the Communist
Party, and the next president of China. But most of the press has been
commenting that not much is known about Vice President Xi.Now
joining us to talk about the vice president and what's happening inside
Chinese Communist Party is Minqi Li. Minqi is an associate professor at
the University of Utah specializing in political economy, world
systems, and the Chinese economy. He was a political prisoner in China
from 1990 to 1992. He's author of the book
After Neoliberalism: Empire, Social Democracy, or Socialism? And he joins us from Salt Lake City. Thanks for joining us, Minqi.
MINQI LI, ASSOCIATE PROF. ECONOMICS, UNIV. UTAH: Thank you.
JAY:
So what do you know about the vice president? And what—do we expect any
changes in terms of the course of the Chinese Communist Party? What's
happening in the party and in terms of political circles outside of it,
especially in a situation where we might be on the verge of another
major global recession? European economy is—still seems to be ready to
unravel. So talk to us about the debate that's happening in Beijing.LI:
Well, this—Vice President Xi's visit in the U.S. takes place at a
critical moment in term of what is going on within China. And Xi, of
course, is widely expected to replace Hu Jintao to become the next
general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the next
president of People's Republic. And then this transition will determine
not only China's next leadership; potentially could also determine
China's future direction in term of economic and political development
in the next decade—and, in fact, intense debate that is now taking place
within the Chinese Communist Party, with the party right wing
[incompr.] further movement in the direction of free market capitalism.
And on the other hand, it appears that a left wing has emerged within
the party that is trying to some extent to adjust China's current
direction towards capitalism, and even to some extent make some
reversal.
JAY: Reversal meaning increase, rebuild the public sector and some of the elements of socialism.
LI: In that way, yes.
JAY: And do we have any sense were Vice President Xi is in all of this?
LI:
It's not clear at this point. Xi, of course, is the son of a veteran
revolutionary, Xi Zhongxun, who participated in the Chinese revolution
with Mao Zedung. And then the experience of Xi Zhongxun, and then his
son Xi Jinping, has been complicated one. On the one hand, Xi Zhongxun
is believed to be among those party leaders who were purged during the
Cultural Revolution. So for that reason he might have resentments
against Mao Zedung. And on the other hand, because he belonged to this
first generation revolutionary—and so it might be the case that they,
the Xi family, disagree with China's current direction of capitalist
reform.And as far as Xi Jinping himself is concerned, on
the one hand, before he was promoted to the current position, he was the
party's secretary of the Zhejiang province, where he led the economic
development by promoting private enterprises. So in that way you might
say he could be someone who was in favor of capitalist reform. But on
the other hand, he had maintained close relationships with many children
of the first generation revolutionary and has shown some support of the
Chongqing experiment, the experiment in the southwestern city of
Chongqing, which promoted more social spending, crackdown on organized
crime, that is favored by the left but is opposed by the right.
JAY: Now, is there anyone that's particularly associated in the party as being of the left that's at a leadership level?
LI:
Well, it is widely believed Bo Xilai, the party secretary in the city
of Chongqing, is leading this left turn of the party. However, just
before—a few days before Xi's visit to the U.S., the local police chief
of the Chongqing city, for unknown reasons, entered into the U.S.
consulate in Chengdu and stayed there for one day. And then the real
reason behind that is still unclear, but there has been speculation that
this incident could undermine the political prospect of Bo Xilai, the
left leader in the party.
JAY: And there are suggestions
that that's all tied up with some kind of local corruption scandal, is
there not? And I guess it's not clear where this is all going to go.
LI:
Yeah, that's part of the speculation. And then some others have
speculated that it might be part of the conspiracy of the right wing in
the party.
JAY: To actually go after this left-wing leader.
Now, is this division between what you're describing as left and right a
division of those who want to develop—or some form of kind of socialist
framework? Or is it a little bit more like a division we see in the
West, sort of, between austerity types and Keynesians?
LI:
Well, it's the—of course this—you might want to compare this Chinese
division between the left and right to—some way to what is going on in
the West, although in the Western case we know that even the social
democrats have basically become only moderate neoliberals. On the other
hand, in the Chinese case, because China has got this socialist
legacy—so even moderate change in the left direction could potentially
lead to farther change more in the socialist or left development that
could alarm the right wing.
JAY: Now, the recent sort of
scandal, you could say, with the coming to international attention of
what's happening at Foxconn, the enormous electronics manufacturer,
which among other things works for Apple—but this is not just an Apple
situation, and actually not just a Foxconn situation—but when you see
the terrible working conditions and the violation of Chinese law—. You
know, this is still supposed to be—I mean, they call themselves a
workers party, the Chinese Communist Party. Is there any reflection of
this in the struggle that—you know, how do you have such horrible
working conditions and claim to be still a communist party?
LI:
Well, that is, again, part of a debate that is going on within China
now. The fact that Foxconn could enjoy this kind of brutal exploitation
of the workers and then benefit from that suggest the capitalists like
Foxconn have been enjoying the collaboration of many of the local and
the provincial officials. In fact, related to the current debate within
the party, the right wing is promoting this Guangdong model. So
Guangdong is this southern province that has been pioneering this
export-led capitalist growth where companies like Foxconn have
prospered. And so a key question right now has to do with whether the
Guangdong model or the Chongqing model is going to be favored by the
next leadership of the Communist Party.
JAY: And again, do
we have any idea where the vice president, Xi, is on this? He seems not
to speak a lot publicly, in the sense that even you who follows this
stuff so closely kind of have to speculate about where he stands on
things.
LI: Well, I guess part of the implicit rule for the
Chinese leadership is that if you speak too publicly about your
position, that will dramatically reduce your own chance of being
promoted. But on the other hand, now there is wide recognition that
China's current social and economic model cannot be sustained much
longer, both because China could no longer rely upon the export-led
growth model—therefore China will have to find alternative ways to
promote effective demand—and because rising social equality could
potentially lead to huge political instability. And, therefore, in these
kind of circumstances it's necessary for China to search for an
alternative mode of development, and ideally that will lead to more
redistribution that will favor the great majority of Chinese people.
That will in turn make China's development more sustainable.
JAY:
Now, is there any debate (I guess there must be some, but how intense
is it?) to allow legitimate, independent unions? I mean, it doesn't seem
that you're going to have any real possibility of enforcement of
Chinese laws in places like Foxconn unless the workers have some more
right to organize unions and defend themselves. What's—how is the debate
on that issue going?
LI: To some extent there have been
discussions about that. But in the Chinese context, on the one hand,
it's not just a question about labor laws. As you said earlier, China
has already got many labor laws. But the question is that they are not
being enforced. So unless the central government is serious about that,
then could have—really push the local governments to enforce existing
labor laws, additional labor laws probably would not help.
JAY:
And as I say, what's happening in terms of organizing independent
unions? For example, if independent unions do get started in certain
places—if I understand correctly, it used to be it was very possible
that workers could wind up being arrested, or threatened, at any rate,
lose their jobs. I mean, is that still happening?
LI: Well,
[incompr.] I guess arrest is happening less these days, I mean, arrest
by the police. But if serious workers protest taking place—and then, of
course, the bosses would still call in the police as a way to repress
workers. Then of course the strike leaders could still be threatened by
losing their jobs. And so in many ways it depends on what is taking
place on the ground, what is taking place in the term of actual
organizing capacity of the workers against the ability for the
capitalists to use their own social influence.
JAY: And how
does this—is there a trend within the party—is it possible to speak up
in the party about this kind of issue? Are there advocates for workers,
you know, this kind of workers rights or independent unions? Can they
speak publicly about this in the party? Is there any sense of it?
LI:
Well, there's—the debate is probably taking place in implicit ways. So
part of the right-wing strategy right now is that they also talk about
the Chinese economy is suffering from imbalances. But they are arguing
that the solution to that is to redistribute income from the government
to the capitalists. They are calling for more tax cut for the
capitalists. And, of course, if this strategy is indeed implemented, it
will further undermine the public sector. While the left-wing is in
favor of redistribution from the capitalists to the workers. So in the
coming month or years, we will know which side will prevail in this
intra-party debate.
JAY: And outside the party, is there signs of these workers protests taking on more political form?
LI:
Not yet. What is going on is that the workers in the capitalist sector,
the new capitalist sector, when they are organizing struggles for
higher wage, better working conditions—so primarily it's still economic
struggle. And on the other hand, you might argue that the state sector
workers, or the old state sector workers, as they are organizing
struggle against privatization—and over the past few years, that have
got a growing political character, especially when that is in
combination with more and more mass-based pro-Maoist movement.
JAY: And just finally, how significant is that mass-based pro-Maoist movement?
LI:
It in fact has become quite significant. It has become something that
is comparable to the Occupy Wall Street movement that is taking place in
the U.S., except in the Chinese case, in fact, it's taking place on
larger scales, involving possibly hundreds of thousands of people across
the whole country, and more regularly every year, twice, on the
birthday of Mao Zedung and on the day when Mao Zedung passed away.
JAY: And is—I keep saying
finally,
but this is too interesting not to ask another question. So is this
kind of nostalgia for going back to the past? Or is this an idea that
China needs to go into some new form, but of socialism and sort of the
original ideals, if not the way it actually worked out?
LI:
Well, it certainly has to do with nostalgia to some degree, but then I
think it's more a protest of China's current economic social model and
China's current direction of development, and then calling for the
benefits of economic growth to be shared more evenly. So in that way it
reflects people's desire for more direction in the socialist form.
JAY: Alright. Thanks very much for joining us, Minqi.
LI: Thank you very much.
JAY: And thank you for joining us on The Real News Network.
End